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Chapter 4
Net Worth and Housing Equity
in Retirement
Todd Sinai and Nicholas Souleles

Real house prices grew by about 40 percent on average and by as much as
100 percent in some metropolitan areas between 2000 and 2005 in the USA.
This rapid growth has renewed interest in identifying the role that housing
equity plays in the net worth of retirees, and how much of their housing
equity retirees can tap to fund nonhousing consumption. This chapter
documents how the evolution of house prices since 1983 has affected lifecycle profiles of net worth. We also estimate how much of the growth
of housing equity is actually available for nonhousing consumption for
households nearing retirement age and older.
In what follows, we use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to show
that the net worth of retirement-age households rose significantly in the
early part of this decade, tracking trends in house prices. Although housing
equity also rose, it did not grow as much as net worth, in this part because
nonhousing assets appreciated at the same time as housing. In addition, it
appears that younger elderly increased their housing debt to offset some of
the rise in house values and invested some of the proceeds from the debt in
other assets. We then consider how much of households’ housing equity
is available for nonhousing consumption without moving. Many elderly
are reluctant to move, and even if they do move they might not want to
downsize.1 Nevertheless, the elderly can borrow against their house value,
essentially transferring wealth from their heirs (after death) to current
consumption. We use a convenient measure of the equity available to be
extracted from a house: the amount that can be borrowed via a reverse
mortgage. In theory, a reverse mortgage is an ideal way to consume home
equity without incurring the transactions costs from moving.2 It provides
homeowners a lump-sum loan that accrues interest and is settled against
the sale of the house when the homeowner dies or moves out. We consider
two forms of reverse mortgages: first, a theoretical ‘upper-bound’ reverse
mortgage product that provides the maximum possible liquidity; and, second, the actual reverse mortgage products available in 2007, which appear
to still suffer the drawbacks of having a small market.
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Our results show that older homeowners have considerable housing
equity that they can borrow against, but nowhere near as much as standard
measures of housing equity would imply. These results motivate calculating
a modified measure of net worth, ‘consumable net worth,’ that accounts
for the fact that, absent moving, not all housing wealth is available for
nonhousing consumption. Even among households aged 62–69 who have
consumable housing equity, the median consumable net worth in the
upper-bound case is only three-quarters of the standard measure of net
worth. At age 90, the median household could consume only 91 percent of
standard net worth.
Compared to prior research, our chapter makes two contributions. First,
we provide updated cohort and over-time analyses of how net worth and
housing equity have evolved, including during the recent housing boom,
building on Poterba and Samwick (2001) and Coronado, Maki, and Weitzer
(2007), among others. The former study uses the SCF to provide a cohort
analysis through 1992 that includes housing wealth and housing debt.
Coronado, Maki, and Weitzer (2007) analyze home equity and net worth
using two waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Our work
uses the SCF, which enables us to examine many more cohorts and much
older households (up through age 94, compared to age 61 in the original HRS cohort). Second, we provide new estimates of how consumable
housing equity and consumable net worth evolve with age, cohort, and
time.3
In what follows, we first describe the data used for our calculations. Next,
we show how net worth, housing equity, and housing debt evolve over
the life cycle, over time, and by birth cohort. Then we turn to calculating the amount of housing equity available for nonhousing consumption
and the modified measure of consumable net worth. Finally, we briefly
conclude.
Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that housing is different than
most other assets on household balance sheets because of its dual nature as
both an asset and a consumption good. Since people must live somewhere,
they have an implicit liability for housing services that is not recorded in
standard measures of net housing equity and net worth (Sinai and Souleles
2005). Buying a home provides those housing services, but only the housing
asset (net of housing debt) appears on the balance sheet, not the bundled
liability.4 Thus unlike, for instance, a stock portfolio, the housing portfolio
cannot be completely liquidated because there would be no provision for
the housing service liability. Instead, a household must find another way
to extract equity. Complicating the interpretation of the results, changes
in house prices do not necessarily lead to increases in real wealth, even if
housing equity can be reallocated to nonhousing consumption. Because
the price of housing reflects the present value of the entire stream of
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future housing services, for young households who are most ‘short’ housing
services, increases in house prices can be largely offset by increases in
their housing services liability, leaving their real wealth largely unchanged.
But for older homeowners who have a smaller remaining implicit housing
liability, increases in house prices can translate into larger increases in
real wealth, and thus potentially into higher nonhousing consumption.5
However, this increase in consumption comes at the expense of the
next generation, which no longer stands to inherit the increased
housing equity, but still inherits the commensurately higher housing
liability.

Empirical Evidence
The data used for our analysis of housing trends were obtained from the
Federal Reserve Board’s SCF. The SCF is conducted every three years,
and we use the seven cross-sectional survey waves gathered from 1983
to 2004 (excluding the 1986 Survey). The SCF oversamples high-wealth
families, yielding a large number of observations on holders of various
assets and liabilities.6 To make the estimates more representative of the
overall population of the USA, we apply the SCF’s replicate weights. We
exclude households where the head was under the age of 25, age 95+, or
born before 1900; and households whose primary residence was a ranch
or farm, or a mobile home.7 This yields almost 113,000 observations across
the seven surveys.8 With population weights, the data are representative
of 71 million households in 1983 and 97 million in 2004. All dollar values
are inflated to 2004 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) research
series for all urban consumers (CPI-U-RS).
We categorize the SCF households variously by age, birth cohort, survey
year, and remaining life expectancy. We define the age of a household by
the age of the household head, which, by the SCF convention, is defined
as the male spouse of a married couple, the older spouse of a same-sex
couple, or the adult in a single-headed household. The birth cohort is
the decade in which that household head was born, such as 1910–19 for a
head aged 89 in 2004.9 Remaining life expectancy was obtained from actuarial tables created by the Social Security Administration.10 These tables
report expected remaining lifetime and the distribution of the probability
of dying in each future year separately for men and women by age and
year. We merge this to SCF respondents by sex, age, and year. In the case
of married couples, we assume the expected remaining lifetime for the
household is the maximum of the expected remaining lifetimes over both
spouses.
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Life-Cycle Analysis of Housing Equity
and Net Worth
We begin by examining the accumulation and decumulation of assets and
liabilities over the life cycle, focusing on the contribution of housing equity
to both phases. Since the SCF data are cross-sectional, we do not actually
follow the same households over time; instead we must make an assumption
to infer what their life-cycle profiles look like. We can assume either that
households of different ages observed in the same year are comparable,
despite being born in different years, or that households of different ages
but from the same birth cohort are comparable, despite being observed in
different years. We analyze the results under both assumptions.
The first panel of Figure 4-1 provides a cohort-based life-cycle analysis
for household net worth.11 The household’s age, categorized by five-year
groupings, is on the horizontal axis; net worth, given in thousands of 2004
dollars, is on the vertical axis. Each line segment corresponds to the median
net worth for households born in a particular decade. Most segments
span multiple age bins because we have 21 years of surveys. For example,
someone born in 1960 will be in the 25–29 bin as of the 1989 survey, the
30–34 bin in the 1992 survey, the 35–39 bin in the 1995 and 1998 surveys,
and the 40–44 bin in the 2001 and 2004 surveys. The dots correspond to
the median net worth across all households in that age bin, regardless of
birth cohort. (Cohort × age groups that have fewer than 11 observations
are omitted from the segment drawings, but not from the calculations for
the dots.)
The dots illustrate the usual age profile for net worth, with a steady accumulation between age 25 and 64, and generally a decumulation thereafter.
Net worth peaks at retirement age at around a median of $250,000 (in 2004
dollars). There are two other notable results in this figure. First, median net
worth declines until age 80 (falling to just under $200,000), but then, for
the 1900–09 and 1910–19 cohorts, begins to rise again. Second, while the
cohort line segments are tightly overlapping for households between the
ages of 25 and 54, they diverge after that. That is, for the most recent periods (the most recent age bins), the segments lie above the prior cohorts’
segment. This is especially true for the 1930–9 and 1940–9 birth cohorts.
Potential explanations for these patterns can be found in Panel B of
Figure 4-1, which calculates the age profile of median net worth by the year
of the SCF survey. For clarity, only a subset of the SCF years is displayed.
The dots, being sample medians by age computed using all the SCF years,
are the same across both panels. In Panel B, the different SCFs’ age profiles
generally peak between age 55 and 64 and, with the exception of the 2004
SCF, decline with age or are level through age 94. Analogous to the first
panel, there is relatively little difference in median net worth across SCFs

17:3

978–0–19–954910–8

04-Ameriks-c04

OUP239-Ameriks

(Typeset by SPI, Delhi)

50 of 78 February 29, 2008

50 Todd Sinai and Nicholas Souleles
Panel A
500

400

300

200

100

25--29 30--34 35--39 40--44 45--49 50--54 55--59 60--64 65--69 70--74 75--79 80--84 85--89 90--94

Age of household head
1983 SCF
1992 SCF
1998 SCF
2001 SCF
2004 SCF
category aggregate
median

Panel B
500

400

300

200

100

0
25--29 30--34 35--39 40--44 45--49 50--54 55--59 60--64 65--69 70--74 75--79 80--84 85--89 90--94

Age of household head

Figure 4-1. Median net worth in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Panel A.
Net worth by age and birth cohort. Panel B. Net worth by age and SCF year.
Source: Authors’ computations from Survey of Consumer Finances 1983–2004.
Note: Sample limited to homeowners with positive net worth. We exclude age ×
cohort or age × SCF year cells with fewer than 11 observations. Values are in
thousands of 2004 dollars.
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for households under age 55. But for older households, net worth grows
from 1983 to 1998, and then from 1998 through 2004.12 These results
suggest that the 2001 and 2004 increases in net worth for households
approaching retirement age and older are responsible for the earlier patterns in the cohort analysis in the first panel. That is, the upward slant of
the cohort lines is due to net worth growing over time for everyone, rather
than age-based accumulation. For example, the 1930–9 and 1940–9 cohort
lines in the top panel have the steepest increase in their last two age bins
because they have the most concentrated exposure to 2001 and 2004 in
those bins. Likewise, the upturn in net worth in the top panel between age
85 and 94 could be due to the run-up in the 2000s overwhelming the usual
life-cycle drawdown of net worth.
One key factor behind the rise in net worth between 1998 and 2004 is the
growth in housing values. As displayed in Figure 4-2, during the seven years
between 1998 and 2004, the index of real national average house prices
rose by about 25 percent, more than the growth over the 16 years between
1983 and 1998.13 The index measures house price appreciation from repeat
sales of the same houses, thus controlling for changes in the quality or size

Index value: Sample average = 1

1.4

1.2
Real Price

1

0.8
1980q1

1985q1

1990q1 1995q1
Year

2000q1

2005q1

Figure 4-2. Time patterns in real house prices (1980:1–2007:1). Source: OFHEO
Conventional Mortgage House Price Index; BLS CPI-All Urban Consumers.
Note: The index is normalized so that the average over the sample period equals
one.
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of houses. This raises the question: How much of the recent growth in net
worth among households of retirement age was due to growth in housing
values?
It appears that at least some of the growth in net worth was due to
growth in housing values, but not all. Both the cohort and SCF-year graphs
of median home equity by age in Figure 4-3 mimic the patterns for net
worth in Figure 4-1, indicating that growth in home equity played a role.
However, while housing clearly accounts for a large portion of the recent
increase in net worth for seniors, the dollar amounts in Figures 4-3A and
4-3B are smaller than for net worth (both on average and for the changes
over time). For example, while median home equity for 65- to 69-year olds
rose from about $100,000 to $140,000 between 1998 and 2004, median net
worth rose from about $220,000 to $320,000. In addition, the rise in the
value of home equity between 1983 and 2001 occurred almost exclusively
for households aged 65 and over while the increase in net worth was spread
across all ages.14 Indeed, Figure 4-4 shows that while net worth excluding
housing equity still shows a substantial increase between 1983 and 2004,
nonhousing net worth grew over this time period for all ages, not just for
those over age 65. These differences suggest that housing equity growth
alone cannot fully explain net worth.
Another way to see that net worth rose by more than housing equity is
shown in Figure 4-5. Conditional on home-owning, the ratio of housing
equity to net worth is relatively constant at about 40–60 percent over the
life cycle and over time. (The ratio starts to increase at retirement, rising
from 40 percent to about 70 percent for the oldest seniors, consistent with
households drawing down their liquid assets first.) This persistence over
time can happen only when net worth experiences the same percentage
growth as home equity which, given the higher initial level of net worth,
implies that net worth increases more in absolute terms than housing
equity. In addition, the time pattern of the equity-to-net-worth ratio does
not match the growth of house prices. In 1983, equity to net worth was
unusually high and for the 1998 through 2004 SCFs the ratio is generally
lower (for any given age).
While the growth in housing equity may not fully explain the rise in net
worth, the growth in house values may do better. That is, if homeowners
increased their housing debt to offset rising house values and used the
proceeds to invest in other assets, that could explain a pattern of net worth
rising faster than housing equity.15 One fact consistent with this hypothesis
is that the growth in net worth was concentrated in the population of
homeowners. If one re-graphs Panel A of Figure 4-1 while restricting the
sample to homeowners, the results for their net worth look very similar to
the original results for the overall population’s net worth. By contrast, the
corresponding graph for renters looks much different: renters’ net worth
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Figure 4-3. Median home equity in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Panel A. Home equity by age and birth cohort. Panel B. Home equity by age and
SCF year. Source: See Figure 4-1. Notes: Sample limited to homeowners with positive
home equity and positive net worth. Values are in thousands of 2004 dollars.
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Figure 4-4. Median net worth exclusive of home equity, by age and SCF year. Source: See Figure 4-1.
Notes: Sample is limited to homeowners with positive net worth and home equity, and with 0 < home
equity/net worth < 1. Values are in thousands of 2004 dollars.
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Figure 4-5. Median ratio of home equity to total net worth, by age and SCF year. Source: See
Figure 4-1. Notes: Sample limited to homeowners with positive net worth and home equity, and with
zero < home equity/net worth < one. Values are in thousands of 2004 dollars.
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does not rise with age and does not increase with house values. (However,
the data are somewhat noisy at older ages, since few elderly rent).
Of course, one cannot automatically conclude from these last results that
the rise in house values was solely responsible for the growth in net worth
for home-owning seniors. First, the population of renters is potentially very
different from the population of owners. For example, renters are generally
poorer and less likely to own assets that can significantly appreciate. Their
median net worth is quite low, under $10,000 for most of the life cycle.
Second, the fraction of seniors that rents is small. As shown in Figure 4-6,
by age 35, the majority of households own their homes; by retirement
age, some 80 percent of households are owners. The homeownership rate
does not begin to decline much until age 80, reaching 60 percent only by
age 90–94. Thus, the vast majority of elderly do not sell their homes and
become renters. In general, there is no clear time pattern across SCFs in
the homeownership rate. While the data are somewhat noisy, there is some
indication that the homeownership rate among the elderly rose between
1983 and 2004, from 60–70 percent to 70–80 percent, depending on the
household’s age.
As house values rose more than housing equity, this suggests that homeowners may have reallocated their housing equity into other assets. Yet this
appears to be less so the case for the elderly than for households aged 60–
64 or younger. Figure 4-7 reports the gross value (not subtracting debt) of a
household’s primary residence. The figure clearly shows the rise in house
values in recent years, as the age profiles from more recent SCFs lie above
those from earlier SCFs, sometimes by as much as 30 percent. Comparing
Figure 4-7 to Figure 4-3, Panel B (home equity), one can see that the dollar
increase in house values often exceeds the increase in home equity. In
Figure 4-7, there is a steady rise over time in house values, which appears at
all ages and is especially pronounced for households aged 65 and over. By
contrast, in Figure 4-3B, home equity does not grow much between 1983
and 2001 for those under age 65. For example, the median home equity
rose by about $60,000 between 1983 and 2004 for households aged 60–64.
House values for the same age group increased by about $100,000 over that
same time period. After age 65, however, housing equity tracks house values
more closely. The increase in home equity between 1983 and 2004 is much
closer to the growth in house values for the 65–69 age group and, by age
70–74, is almost exactly the same.
One possible explanation is that for younger households’ housing debt,
including first and second mortgages as well as home equity loans and
lines of credit, rose along with house values. For seniors, this explanation
is limited by the fact that few seniors have any housing debt. In the top
panel of Figure 4-8, only about 60 percent of home-owning households
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Figure 4-6. Percent homeowners by age and SCF year. Source: See Figure 4-1.
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Figure 4-7. Median value of the primary residence by age and SCF year. Source: See Figure 4-1.
Notes: Sample limited to homeowners. Values are in thousands of 2004 dollars.
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Figure 4-8. Percent of households with any housing debt by age and SCF year. Source: See Figure 4-1.
Notes: Sample is limited to homeowners.
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aged 60–64 have any housing debt whatsoever, and this ratio steadily
declines with age until it levels out at about 10 percent of households
aged 80 and above. While this age profile is relatively stable over time, a
smaller fraction of households of almost any age had housing debt in 1983
and a larger fraction held housing debt in 2004. Especially for households
aged 65 through 80, borrowing against the house appears to have become
steadily more prevalent over the 1983 through 2004 time period, rising by
as much as 20 percentage points.
Conditional on having any housing debt, the amount of debt rose substantially. In Figure 4-9, the pattern of the dots indicates that median debt
amounts decline with age. However, the households surveyed in more
recent SCF years have higher debt levels at almost every age through 70–74.
Unlike the frequency of having housing debt, the rise in the amount of debt
is largely a younger-household phenomenon. (One important caveat: since
so few of the very elderly have debt, it is difficult to draw inferences for that
age group.)16
One reason that the amount of housing debt rose with house values
might be that households tend to keep their leverage ratio constant.
Figure 4-10 reports median loan-to-house value (LTV) ratios by age for
homeowners who have housing debt. Indeed, except from 1983 to 1992, the
age profiles of LTV have not changed much over time. Thus the (percent)
growth in debt has generally kept up with the (percent) growth in house
values, keeping the ratio of debt to value roughly constant. This implies
that while the dollar amount of home equity rose with the increase in house
prices, it did not rise as much in absolute terms as house values. And given
how few elderly have housing debt, even the apparent increases in leverage
between 1992/1998 and 2001/2004 for homeowners aged 75 and older
have only a small effect on aggregate leverage.
In the absence of panel data, it is difficult to directly show whether
households actually used the proceeds from higher housing debt to invest
in other assets. Nonetheless, in the two panels of Figure 4-11 we attempt
to shed some light on the matter. Panel A reports the median value of
nonhousing assets, measured as total assets minus the value of the primary residence. Panel B reports the median value of nonhousing assets
minus housing debt, measured as total assets minus both the value of
the primary residence and the debt on that house. If housing debt is
reallocated, at least in part, to investments in nonhousing assets rather than
being wholly spent on current consumption, we would expect the life-cycle
profiles in the top panel to increase over time more than the ones in the
bottom panel. To elaborate on the comparison: ceteris paribus, changes in
house values without a change in housing debt should affect neither the
top nor the bottom panels since only nonhousing assets are measured.
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Figure 4-9. Total housing debt for households with any housing debt by age and SCF year. Source: See
Figure 4-1. Notes: Sample is limited to homeowners with any housing debt. Values are in thousands
of 2004 dollars.
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Figure 4-10. Median ratio of home secured loans to home value by age and SCF year. Source: See
Figure 4-1. Notes: Sample is limited to homeowners with positive primary residence debt.
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Figure 4-11. Median value of assets minus primary residence value in the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). Panel A. Value of assets minus primary residence value
by age and SCF year. Panel B. Value of assets minus primary residence value by age
and SCF year. Source: See Figure 4-1. Notes: Sample limited to homeowners. Values
are in thousands of 2004 dollars.
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Changes in the value of nonhousing assets should have the same effect
on both the top and the bottom panels. However, an increase in housing debt that is used to invest in nonhousing assets should raise the lifecycle profile in the top panel (since assets go up but housing debt is not
netted out) but not in the bottom panel (where housing debt is netted
out). Conversely, an increase in housing debt that is spent would have no
effect on the top panel but would lower the life-cycle profile in the bottom
panel.
For younger households, below age 65, the top panel shows a rising
life-cycle profile between 1983 and 2004. By contrast, the bottom panel
exhibits no such pattern and, in fact, the 2004 profile lies below most of the
other profiles through age 54. This pattern suggests that while nonhousing
assets rose faster than house values for the median household in this age
range, the difference could be explained by growth in housing debt. For
households aged 65 and over, nonhousing assets were also growing steadily
between 1983 and 2004. But unlike for younger households, there is less difference between the top and bottom panels for the 65-and-up households
and almost no difference by age 75. Again, that is because so few of the very
elderly hold housing debt, so at the median there can be little reallocation
from housing equity to net worth.
Last, we consider the fact that trends in house values might reflect not
just changes in house prices, but also moves to different houses and other
changes in the quantity or quality of housing. The SCF does not report
a household’s entire housing history. But, in addition to (self-reported)
current house-value, the survey asks for the price that homeowners paid
for their current house when they purchased it and how much they spent
on remodeling and additions in the interim. This allows us to roughly
estimate how much of households’ housing equity is due to the capital gain
on their current house. Figure 4-12 reports median real housing capital
gains expressed as a percentage of house equity. We construct this variable
by taking the difference between the self-reported house value (in 2004
dollars) and the self-reported purchase price (in 2004 dollars), subtracting
out spending on remodeling and additions, and then dividing by current
housing equity.17 Given the limitations of the data, the resulting measure
will likely provide a lower bound on the actual fraction of housing equity
due to capital gains.18
Even so, in 2001 and 2004 the fraction of housing equity due to capital
gains rose substantially, to more than 30 percent of housing equity for
the most senior elderly. In earlier years, by contrast, housing capital gains
appear to have contributed relatively little to housing equity. In any case, in
recent years housing capital gains were clearly a large source of wealth for
households in retirement.
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Figure 4-12. Median ratio of capital gains and losses on homes to total home equity, by age and SCF
Year. Source: See Figure 4-1. Note: Sample limited to homeowners who acquired homes after 1966 and
have positive home equity.
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Consumable Housing Equity and Net Worth
Given the recent increase in housing equity documented above, we next
assess how much of that equity the elderly can tap, both in theory and in
practice.

Methodology
To implement this, we compute the amount of housing equity consumable
by a household without moving, using two variants of a reverse mortgage.
First, we calculate the theoretical upper-bound amount that a homeowner
could borrow against his house from a risk-neutral lender. Second, as a
lower bound, we identify how much a homeowner could borrow using the
actual reverse mortgage programs in place in the first quarter of 2007.
After computing the resulting amounts of consumable housing equity, we
calculate the corresponding modified measures of consumable net worth,
which includes only consumable housing equity rather than all housing
equity.
We follow Venti and Wise (1991) in computing the maximum fraction
of a house’s value that could be borrowed using a reverse mortgage from
a risk-neutral lender. Suppose a household borrows a lump-sum amount L
today, lets it cumulatively compound, and pays off the resulting total liability at death using the proceeds from the sale of the house. This is basically
how current reverse mortgages work. Since the bank is risk neutral, it will
set the initial loan amount such that in expectation the sale value of the
house will exactly equal the mortgage balance at the time of the homeowner’s death. In this case, the initial loan amount L is determined by:
L=

A



(1 + g)t−a H d (t |a ) (1 + m)−(t−a) d

(4-1)

t=a

where a is the current age of the homeowner, H is the current house value,
and d(t|a) is the probability of dying in year t conditional on being age a
currently. (In the case of married couples, we use the age of the youngest
spouse, which determines the conditional survival probability as used by
reverse mortgage lenders.) The nominal mortgage interest rate is m and
g is the nominal growth rate of house prices, for simplicity both assumed
to be constant and m > g. In our calculations, for m we use the average
nominal 30-year mortgage interest rate in the year the household reports
having taken out the loan. For g, we will use the long-run average national
real growth rate in house prices, 1 percent per year, plus the expected
10-year average annual inflation rate from the Livingston Survey in the
year of the SCF survey.
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Table 4-1 ‘Upper-Bound’ Housing Equity Available for Consumption, by Age
Age
Category

25–61
62–69
70–79
80–89
90–94
Median if
age ≥ 62

%>0

Median
Value if > 0

Median Ratio
‘Consumable’
Housing
Equity to
House Equity

34.7
88.5
95.8
99.1
100.0
93.6

25,690
50,499
66,728
76,752
103,093
62,673

0.26
0.49
0.64
0.78
0.89
0.60

‘Consumable’
Housing Equity

Median Net Median Ratio
Worth Using ‘Consumable’
‘Consumable’ Net Worth to
Housing
Standard Net
Equity
Worth
117,991
173,534
160,743
164,036
217,212
166,116

0.59
0.74
0.80
0.86
0.91
0.80

Source : Authors’ computations.
Notes: ‘Consumable’ housing equity is defined as the amount of capital that could be
extracted from a house by a risk-neutral mortgage lender (given the owners’ ages and
genders and prevailing 30-year fixed mortgage rates), less the existing debt secured by the
primary residence. Net worth using ‘consumable’ housing equity replaces housing equity in
the net worth calculation with ‘consumable’ housing equity. Sample includes homeowners
with houses with values less than $1 million, 1989–2004 SCF.

From L, we net out existing housing debt D to obtain our measure of
consumable housing equity, CHE ≡ L − D . While L must be nonnegative,
CHE can be negative if existing debt exceeds the amount of potential
reverse mortgage. (In this case, the household can be thought of as having
a net housing liability, in that it will need to pay for a portion of its housing
consumption out of income or nonhousing wealth.)
The potential loan amount L is primarily a function of the expected
remaining lifetime of the household. If a household is expected to live a
long time, any amount it borrows has a long time to compound before
it is settled against the proceeds of the house sale. Thus the lender,
who in expectation needs to have the sale value of the house equal
the accumulated debt in order to break even, will lend a smaller initial
amount to a young household, ceteris paribus. An older household could
borrow a greater fraction of the house value since it will repay the loan
sooner.19

Results
The results of applying Equation (4-1) are tabulated by age in Table 4-1.
The first column reports the fraction of households who have positive
consumable housing equity. Very few young households have positive
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consumable equity (first row of the first column), and for those that do, the
median amount of equity is small (first row of the second column). This is
because young households have high debt loads relative to house value and
long life expectancies. By comparison, older households are more likely
to have positive consumable home equity and greater amounts of equity.
Given the topic of this chapter, we will focus on the households aged 62
and older.
It is clear from Table 4-1 that older households have the potential for
significant consumable housing equity. For those aged 62–69, for example, among the 88.5 percent with positive consumable equity, the median
amount is almost $50,500. By age 90, all home-owning households have
consumable housing equity, in part because housing debt is almost nonexistent and also because remaining life expectancy is short. The median
amount of consumable equity for that age group is about $103,000.
While consumable home equity can be substantial in dollar terms, it can
nonetheless be a relatively small fraction of housing equity as measured in
the standard way. For example, households aged 62–69 can consume only
49 percent of their standard housing equity.20 By age 70–79, only about
two-thirds of housing equity is consumable, and even by age 90, less than
90 percent is consumable.
Using consumable housing equity also makes a big difference to net
worth. The fifth column of Table 4-1 calculates consumable net worth
using our measure of consumable housing equity rather than the standard
measure of housing equity, and the sixth column compares the result to
the standard definition of net worth. For younger households, consumable
net worth is only a small fraction of reported net worth, again because they
have relatively larger debt and longer life expectancies. (One can think
of one’s housing asset as being largely dedicated to paying for one’s large
future housing liability, and so effectively unavailable for nonhousing consumption.) By age 62–69, less than three-quarters of the standard measure
of net worth is consumable. Even by age 90, only 91 percent of net worth is
consumable.
While Table 4-1 provides a useful theoretical benchmark, in practice
reverse mortgage markets do not generally allow one to borrow as much
as assumed using Equation (4-1). First, legal and marketing considerations
require that lenders collect the lesser of their debt position or the house
value. Thus, they reduce the initial loan amounts to be relatively confident
that the house value will exceed the debt position at the time of death.
Second, problems of adverse selection (long-lived borrowers) and moral
hazard (borrowers do not maintain their houses) also reduce the amount
that lenders are willing to lend. Finally, current reverse mortgage markets
might also suffer from other early-stage problems of a new financial product, such as thinness or lack of familiarity.
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To bound the differences between the theoretical and current reverse
mortgages, we recalculate consumable housing equity using the actual
amount a household could borrow through a current reverse mortgage,
using the program parameters in place in the first quarter of 2007. We
used the on-line reverse mortgage calculator (www.financialfreedom.com/
calculator) to calculate how much a borrower in zip code 60614 (Cook
County, Chicago) could obtain from the three primary reverse mortgage
programs: Federal Housing Administration/Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s (FHA/HUD) ‘Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
(HECM) Advantage’, Fannie Mae’s ‘Homekeeper’, and Financial Freedom’s ‘Cash Account Advantage.’ These programs currently lend only to
those aged 62 or older, so we computed the potential loan amount for
each aged between 62 and 94, and for house values in $25,000 increments between $0 and $1 million. For each age × house value cell,
we used the maximum loan amount from the three programs. That
loan amount was imputed to households in the SCF using the age of
the youngest spouse and their self-reported house value. When the SCF
house value lay between the $25,000 bins, we linearly interpolated the
loan amount. From this potential reverse mortgage amount we netted
out existing housing debt, since that is what a reverse mortgage lender
would do.
The amount one can borrow through the reverse mortgage market has
been increasing steadily over time and is expected to continue to do so.
Thus we view this exercise as providing a lower bound on future access to
home equity. However, we did not net out fees, which are sizable in the
current reverse mortgage market—they can be upward of 15 percent of
the loan amount. Thus, our calculations still overstate currently available
consumable equity.
Results appear in Table 4-2, which mimics Table 4-1 but uses the new
computation of consumable housing equity. Since households younger
than 62 are not eligible for reverse mortgages, their consumable housing equity is no greater than zero. Overall, the actual reverse mortgage
programs generally provide positive consumable housing equity to fewer
households than does the upper-bound theoretical program, especially
at younger ages. For example, only 60 percent of 62–69-year-olds have
positive consumable housing equity under the actual reverse mortgage
programs versus 88.5 percent under the theoretical upper bound. And
for the households with positive equity, the actual programs generally
provide a smaller amount of housing equity. In this dimension, the gap
increases with age: for households aged 62 and over, median consumable
housing equity (conditional on being positive) ranges from $51,000 to
$94,000, or about 49 to 76 percent of total housing equity. The ratio
of consumable net worth to the standard measure of net worth reflects

Au: Please check
whether the
expanded form
of ‘FHA/HUD’
is correct.
Au: Please check
whether the
expanded form
of ‘HECM’ is
correct.
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Table 4-2 Actual Housing Equity Available for Consumption, by Age
Age
Category

25–61
62–69
70–79
80–89
90–94
Median if
age ≥ 62

%>0

Median
Value if > 0

Median Ratio
‘Consumable’
Housing
Equity to
House Equity

0.0
60.0
90.9
97.0
99.3
80.1

0
50,981
62,131
68,648
93,776
60,429

0.00
0.49
0.58
0.65
0.76
0.56

‘Consumable’
Housing Equity

Median Net Median Ratio
Worth Using ‘Consumable’
‘Consumable’ Net Worth to
Housing
Standard Net
Equity
Worth
0
150,423
156,242
154,510
202,874
154,205

0.00
0.71
0.75
0.79
0.82
0.75

Source: Authors’ computations.
Notes: ‘Consumable’ housing equity is defined as the maximum amount of capital that could
be extracted from a house by a reverse mortgage using the programs available in 2007,
netting out the existing debt secured by the primary residence. These programs lend only
to those aged 62 and older. Net worth using ‘consumable’ housing equity replaces housing
equity in the net worth calculation with ‘consumable’ housing equity. Sample includes
homeowners with houses with values less than $1 million, 1989–2004 SCF.

these patterns. It ranges from 71 percent for young seniors to 82 percent
for the oldest seniors and is always lower than under the theoretical
program.
Comparisons between Tables 4-1 and 4-2 are complicated by the fact
that in Table 4-1 we used the mortgage interest and expected inflation
rates at the time of the SCF survey year, but in Table 4-2, by applying the 2007 reverse mortgage program, we implicitly use 2007 rates.
Table 4-3 attempts to provide a better comparison by using just the 2004
SCF households for both computations.21 The current reverse mortgage
program is less generous than the theoretical one. The current program gives markedly fewer younger retirees access to consumable housing equity—for example, only 51 percent of 62–69-year-olds versus 90
percent in the theoretical program—and the amounts of equity are also
smaller.
A natural question to ask is how the recent trends in house values
affected these results. Consumable housing equity will generally increase
with greater house values. But, as already noted, the recent increase in
house values was partly offset by increased debt. Table 4-4 explores how
this process played out, focusing on the ratio of consumable net worth to
standard net worth, by SCF year, using the theoretical reverse mortgage
program from Table 4-1 (which generally overstates consumable housing
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Table 4-3 Comparing ‘Upper-Bound’ and Actual ‘Consumable’ Housing
Equity: 2004 Only
Age
Category

25–61
62–69
70–79
80–89
90–94
Median if
age ≥ 62

Best-Case ‘Consumable’
Housing Equity

Reverse Mortgage
‘Consumable’ Housing Equity

%>0

Median
Value if > 0

%>0

Median
Value if > 0

36.1
89.5
93.7
100.0
100.0
93.7

44,006
80,110
90,497
119,776
113,128
93,217

0.00
51.2
85.7
94.7
100.0
75.84

0
67,768
79,875
102,961
97,810
81,194

Source: Authors’ computations.
Notes: In columns 2 and 3, best-case ‘consumable’ housing equity is defined as the amount
of capital that could be extracted from a house by a risk-neutral mortgage lender in 2004
(given the owners’ ages and genders and prevailing 30-year fixed mortgage rates), less the
existing debt secured by the primary residence. In the last two columns, reverse mortgage
‘consumable’ housing equity is defined as the maximum amount of capital that could
be extracted from a house by a reverse mortgage using the programs available in 2007,
netting out the existing debt secured by the primary residence. These programs lend only
to those aged 62 and older. Sample includes homeowners with houses with values less than
$1 million, 2004 SCF.

equity). The fraction of net worth available for nonhousing consumption
is at or near all-time highs for homeowners aged 62 or older. For those
aged 62–69 in 1989, 69 percent of net worth was consumable; by 2004, that
fraction rose to 80 percent. For 80–89-year-olds, the fraction of net worth
that could be consumed rose from 83 percent in 1989 to 90 percent in
2004.
Underlying these results, the fraction of older households with any consumable housing equity generally declined from the relative house price
peak of 1989 to the trough of 1995–8, and rose with house prices again
through 2004. However, even in 2004, the fraction had not caught up to its
level in 1989. This partly reflects the increased debt we observed in recent
years. The turnaround in the amount of consumable home equity (conditional on being positive) began a little later, in 2001 or 2004, for households aged 62 and older. But by 2004, the median amounts of consumable
housing equity were larger than in 1998, about double for households aged
62 and older. These recent trends reflect both the recent growth in house
prices and the recent decline in interest rates.
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Table 4-4 Ratio of Net Worth Available for Consumption to Standard Net
Worth for Households with ‘Consumable’ Equity, Using
‘Upper-Bound’ Definition, by Age and Year
Age
Category
25–61
62–69
70–79
80–89
90–94
Median if
age ≥ 62

Year
1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

Median

0.50
0.69
0.77
0.83

0.57
0.73
0.82
0.85
0.90
0.80

0.58
0.73
0.79
0.85
0.88
0.79

0.61
0.74
0.79
0.86
0.91
0.81

0.62
0.76
0.80
0.88
0.89
0.80

0.65
0.80
0.83
0.90
0.96
0.84

0.59
0.74
0.80
0.86
0.91
0.80

0.75

Source: Authors’ computations.
Notes: ‘Consumable’ housing equity is defined as the amount of capital that could be
extracted from a house by a risk-neutral mortgage lender (given the owners’ ages and
genders and prevailing 30-year fixed mortgage rates), less the existing debt secured by the
primary residence. Net worth using ‘consumable’ housing equity replaces housing equity in
the net worth calculation with ‘consumable’ housing equity. Sample includes homeowners
with houses with values less than $1 million, 1989–2004 SCF.

Conclusions and Discussion
We have documented the evolution of the life-cycle profiles of net worth
and of housing values, equity, and debt, from 1983 through 2004, using
the SCF. We find that the recent increase in house prices increased the
net worth of retirement-aged households, but less than one-for-one. This
happened, in part, because other assets appreciated along with housing.
In addition, households increased their housing debt, offsetting some of
the increase in house value, and used some of the proceeds to invest in
other assets. However, this latter explanation seems to be most prevalent
among younger households and to a degree among the youngest elderly,
but not among the oldest seniors who do not hold much housing debt.
We also show that a large fraction of seniors’ housing equity is not actually
available for nonhousing consumption, especially for younger retirees. For
example, for the median 62- to 69-year-old household, only 49 percent of
housing equity or about $50,500 can actually be consumed, even using the
theoretical upper-bound reverse mortgage; this excludes the 12 percent
of such households with no consumable housing equity at all. Even for
the median 90-year-old household, only 89 percent of housing equity is
available, or about $103,000.
These results imply that consumable net worth is smaller than standard
calculations of net worth. Even among households aged 62–69 who have
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consumable housing equity, median consumable net worth in the upperbound case is only three-quarters of a standard measure of net worth. By
age 90, the median household could spend only 91 percent of its net worth
on nonhousing consumption. On the other hand, these fractions have
increased in recent years, partly due to increased house values and partly
due to lower interest rates. Overall, these results show that accounting
for the trends in older households’ ability to extract housing equity is
important for obtaining an accurate picture of their consumable net worth
and potential standard of living in retirement.

Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for funding in part by the Zell-Lurie Real Estate
Center at Wharton. Igar Fuki provided outstanding research assistance. We
thank John Ameriks, Julia Coronado, and Olivia S. Mitchell for helpful
comments.

Notes
1
The baseline of no-moving (constant housing consumption) is not only conceptually attractive but also appears to be realistic. Households rarely tap housing
equity by moving and, when they do, it appears to be largely in response to particular circumstances such as an adverse health event (Venti and Wise 1989, 1990, 2004;
Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu, and Shilling 1997). Nor do they appear to plan on selling
their houses to finance retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). On the other hand,
other researchers have found some evidence that households do reoptimize their
housing equity (Coronado, Maki, and Weitzer 2007), or point out that households
have a valuable option to do so (Skinner 2007). Our analysis will not capture the
value of the option to reduce housing consumption. Still, even households that move
(whether they downsize or switch to renting) will have to devote a large portion
of the proceeds from the sale to cover the transactions costs plus future housing
services. Another way to tap housing equity is to simply cut back on maintenance.
(c.f. Davidoff 2006; Gyourko and Tracy 2006). We consider that to be similar to
accessing capital through credit markets in that such households cannot tap all
their housing equity and the amount they can access will depend on the number of
years they expect to remain in their houses.
2
Unlike other forms of housing debt, the borrower cannot default on a reverse
mortgage and he offloads to the lender the risk associated with the uncertainty
over how long he will stay in his home. In practice, reverse mortgages currently
have high fees and interest rates and provide relatively little equity.
3
Most prior studies add all of housing equity to net worth (e.g., Mitchell and
Moore 1998; Poterba and Samwick 2001; Coronado, Maki, and Weitzer 2007).
Others leave housing equity out altogether (Bernheim et al. 2000), or split the difference (Engen, Gale, and Uccello 1999). Venti and Wise (1991) find that a reverse
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mortgage could increase nonhousing consumption by as much as 10 percent on
average, but they do not express that number as a fraction of housing equity or
net worth. Other research on the value of reverse mortgage products focuses on
the potential size of the market for products, rather than the equity available to
be tapped (Merrill, Finkel, and Kutty 1994; Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan
1995).
4
Of course, one can extend this line of reasoning to many other liabilities that
are not measured, for instance households’ expected food expenses. However, in
such cases, there is no matching asset (or durable good) on the other side of the
balance sheet that directly offsets the liability. Buying a house provides a hedge
against changes in housing costs, potentially a perfect hedge for a household that
never sells its house or otherwise has an infinite effective horizon. The example of
long-term care insurance, discussed elsewhere in this volume, is related in that it
hedges future long-term care expenses.
5
Consistent with this implication, Campbell and Cocco (2005) find that the
response of consumption to house prices increases with age.
6
A more complete description of the survey can be found in Bucks, Kennickell,
and Moore (2006).
7
We also drop 22 households who report negative gross assets.
8
We have 3,506 household-level observations in 1983, 13,962 in 1989, 17,235 in
1992, 18,768 in 1995, 19,210 in 1998, 19,854 in 2001, and 20,283 in 2004, for a
total of 112,818. The 1989 through 2004 SCFs have five replicate observations per
household.
9
Naturally, we have relatively more data on households born between 1920 and
1969 as the members of those households are within the age range of 25–94 for
more years of the survey. We have 1,751 observations on household heads born
between 1900 and 1909; 6,735 for 1910–19; 13,915 for 1920–9; 16,988 for 1930–9;
24,496 for 1940–9; 26,199 for 1950–9; 17,130 for 1960–9; and 5,604 for 1970–9.
10
We are grateful to Jeff Brown for sharing these tables with us.
11
The definition of net worth follows Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2006). Assets
include checking, savings, and money-market accounts; call accounts at brokerages; certificates of deposit; directly-held mutual funds; stocks; bonds; retirement
accounts; savings bonds; the cash value of whole life insurance; trusts, annuities,
and managed investment accounts; other financial assets such as royalties and loans
made; vehicles; primary residence, other residential, and nonresidential real estate;
business interests; and other nonfinancial assets such as jewelry and antiques. Debt
includes debt on the primary residence and other residential and nonresidential
real estate; credit-card debt; installment loans not for real estate or credit cards such
as vehicle or student loans; and other debts such as margin loans or loans against
life-insurance policies.
12
Gale and Pence (2006) also find that the largest gains in wealth between 1989
and 2001 accrued to older households.
13
Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) show that the pattern of house price growth
varies considerably across cities, so the national average is an imperfect proxy for the
house price growth experienced by a given household in the SCF. Unfortunately,
city of residence is not publicly available in the SCF and even region is made
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available only in some surveys, so we cannot match external measures of house
price appreciation to households in the SCF.
14
For brevity, subsequent graphs will focus on the over-time life-cycle profiles.
15
Coronado, Maki, and Weitzer (2007) compared two cohorts in the HRS, interviewed in 1992 and 2004, and concluded that households might have increased
their housing debt in response to house appreciation in order to rebalance their
portfolios.
16
The corresponding cohort analysis (not shown) suggests the possibility of a
significant cohort effect, in addition to the time effects just discussed. At any age,
later birth cohorts have more debt than earlier cohorts. If this reflects some decline
in aversion to housing debt for more recent birth cohorts, then one needs to be
careful about extrapolating from today’s seniors to future seniors. Future cohorts
of seniors could arrive in retirement with less housing equity than do the current
elderly.
17
For example, consider a homeowner who purchased a house for $200,000,
financed 100 percent with debt. The house is now worth $210,000. This homeowner’s housing equity ($210,000 current value—$200,000 debt = $10,000) is
entirely capital gain, and thus the household would have a ratio of one. If the homeowner had financed 80 percent with debt, he would have $50,000 in housing equity
($210,000 current value—$160,000 debt) and $10,000 in capital gain ($210,000
current value—$200,000 purchase price) and the ratio would be $10,000/$50,000 =
0.2.
18
Unfortunately, we have a consistent CPI series only back to 1967, so households
who purchased their homes prior to that date are omitted. Also, we cannot adjust
for the length of ownership. Consider a household who purchased a house in
1970 and in 2002 sold it (with a large capital gain) and purchased a new house
using the gain as a down payment. This household would appear to have relatively
small housing capital gains in 2004 because it would have been in the new house
for only two years and we cannot track the capital appreciation from its prior
house.
19
An alternative approach is to suppose that a household draws down its housing
equity by selling its house and renting (through a long-term lease). Since the
household’s housing services are no longer being provided by an owned house, the
household will have to reserve some of the proceeds from the house sale to pay for
its future rents. A younger household that is expected to live a relatively long time
would have to reserve more of the proceeds but an older household could reserve
less, ceteris paribus. We use reverse mortgages to estimate the consumable portion of
housing equity because, unlike rents for owner-occupied houses, mortgage interest
rates are easily observable. In addition, reverse mortgage lenders absorb the uncertainty over length-of-life.
20
It turns out that in every age group in the SCF, the median household with positive consumable housing equity has no housing debt. Thus it makes no difference
whether we report consumable housing equity as a fraction of housing equity or
house value.
21
Even so, we still are comparing the 2004 SCF (with 2004 interest rates and
expected inflation) to the actual 2007 program, so the match is imperfect.

Au: The year has
been changed in
the reference
citation
Coronado, Maki,
and Weitzer
(2006) to
Coronado, Maki,
and Weitzer
(2007).
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